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Abstract
With recent advancements in information technology more and more devices are integrated in the Internet of Things.
These devices gather significant amount of private information pertinent to a user and while, in some cases it helps
in improving the life style of an individual, in others it raises major privacy concerns. This trade-off between utility
and privacy is highly dependent upon the devices in consideration and as the utility of the generated data increases,
the privacy of an individual decreases. In this paper, we formulate a utility-privacy trade-off that enables a user to
make appliance specific decisions as to how much data can be shared. This is achieved by parametrizing the degree
of privacy allowed for each device and enabling the user to configure the parameter of each device. We use the smart
metering application as the test case scenario for the proposed approach. We evaluate its performance using simulations
conducted on the ECO data set. Our results indicate that, the proposed approach is successful in identifying appliances
with an accuracy of 81.8% and a precision of 70.1%. In addition, it is demonstrated that device specific changes of the
configuration parameters allow the degree of privacy achieved for the particular device and the utility to be well controlled,
thus demonstrating the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Moreover, it is shown that, as expected, devices with
higher power consumption contribute more to the overall privacy and utility achieved. A comparative study is also
conducted and the proposed approach is shown to outperform the existing ElecPrivacy approach by producing a trace
that is harder to identify, as reported after testing the Weiss’ and Baranski’s algorithm, both of which are well known
Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring algorithms. Finally, it is demonstrated that the addition of noise, which is an integral
part of the propose approach, can greatly improve performance.
Keywords: Smart Meter, Privacy, Utility-Privacy trade-off, Mutual Information, Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring.
1. Introduction
Internet of Things (IoT) has been one of the key inno-
vations of the last decade. It eliminates the requirement
of having a homogeneous network for ensuring information
exchange, thus, enabling multiple devices to communicate
with each other. By 2020, it is expected that 24 billion
devices will be connected using this innovative technology
thus, generating an expected benefit of 1.2 trillion USD for
the communication industry [1]. IoT objectives go beyond
serving the communications industry, aiming to improve
the quality of life. IoT devices are built on a common
architecture of repetitive sensing and forwarding of infor-
mation thus forming time-series data. This time series
data keeps the client aware and updated about the chang-
ing parameters thus enabling him to react accordingly. A
smart health monitoring device enables a doctor to con-
stantly update the record of a patient’s health and later
use this to make a detailed analysis [2] Likewise, a smart
baby monitor empowers parents with the capability to take
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pre-emptive measures against the reduced growth of their
child with the aid of a constantly updated record of their
child’s activity pattern[3][4]. Similarly, smart meters en-
able consumers to have knowledge on their consumption
pattern thus allowing them to adopt a more cost effective
lifestyle [5][6]. The benefits of having these IoT devices is
only worthwhile if the generated time-series data is kept
secure from the access of an adversary.
An adversary can use this data to learn vital informa-
tion about a person with information spanning from as
small as his average heart rate for a certain period of time
to as huge as a detailed analysis of a person’s heart rate,
location and estimated activity pattern, all using the same
health monitor. Such highly private data collection may
happen with or without the consent of the user and poten-
tially without informing the users how this data can affect
their privacy [7]. The entity collecting the data may also
make this data available to third parties such as insurance
companies for accessing one’s daily lifestyle to identify if
they are maintaining a healthy schedule and then adjust-
ing the premium accordingly [8], marketing agencies for
initiating targeted advertisements, law enforcement agen-
cies for detecting illegal activities and burglars for finding
out the habits of the occupants of a house [9]. Each IoT
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device poses a different set of privacy risks and this has led
to different privacy preserving solutions. One common ap-
proach that exists in literature is that of completely hiding
the generated time-series data, either by using data ag-
gregating methods or randomization techniques [10][11].
These approaches perform well in ensuring privacy but
they curtail the benefits of installing these IoT devices
by excessively protecting an individual’s data thus, de-
priving a user from all the possible set of benefits. The
problem then is to ensure that the privacy issue does not
limit the access to valuable information thus dampening
the data economy and at the same time, the privacy door
is not widely open for anyone to extract vital information.
The need then is to devise a mechanism that empowers
the user with complete control over their information thus
leaving it at their disposal to decide on the kind of ben-
efits they want in exchange for their private information.
Each IoT device harvests a different level of information
and while some devices are very clear in what informa-
tion they gather, others, such as the smart meters, work
in disguise.
Smart meters are advertised as devices that sense and
forward the consumption pattern of a household but the
time-series data that they generate reveals a lot more in-
formation. An adversary can extract vital information
such as the living pattern of an individual along with thor-
ough information regarding the appliances installed in the
household, such as the time of use and the brand of the
washing machines, dryer, kettle, stove, freezer and televi-
sion [9][12]. It is key to highlight here that, smart me-
ters merely store the power consumption for as small as a
single second and then forward it to the utility provider
on a predefined data forwarding rate. The accuracy and
timeliness of this data is the key to all the benefits re-
lated to the smart meters and despite the concerns of a
user, the utility provider would not be willing to let any-
one alter the average power consumption reported between
two data forwarding instances. This bounds the user from
adding or subtracting any information thus, limiting the
choices to merely distorting the available data. Data dis-
tortion can be done using various approaches. One ap-
proach is to add an external hardware, where the privacy
concerned users install an extra battery that is charged
and discharged at irregular intervals, thus generating a
distorted consumption pattern [13]. Another approach in-
volves amending the smart meter network structure and
ensuring neighbourhood-level aggregation of data before
relaying it back to the utility provider (Electric company)
[12]. These approaches have been reported to perform well
in their considered scenarios but the distortion of data at
irregular intervals ensures privacy at the cost of the poten-
tial benefits of smart meters.
In this paper, we propose a novel data distortion ap-
proach that returns the data sharing authority back to the
hands of the user. We formulate a utility-privacy trade-off
mechanism that enables the user to decide “what percent-
age”, of “what data”, related to “which device” should
be shared with the utility provider. The proposed ap-
proach uses the unique signature pattern of each appliance
to identify its existence in a harvesting interval and then,
based on the choice of the user, hides the signature. We use
the term harvesting interval as the time between two data
forwarding instances. The proposed approach is tested
on the ECO (Electricity Consumptions and Occupancy)
data set [14] that provides a unique combination of qual-
ity and quantity of electricity consumption. In particular,
it contains aggregate electricity consumption data, includ-
ing real and reactive power for each of the three phases and
plug level measurements of selected household appliances.
The data is being collected at 1Hz granularity and over a
period of 8 months. Despite the size of the data and the
huge variation in power consumption pattern of different
devices in a household, the proposed approach was success-
ful in correctly identifying appliances with an accuracy of
81.8% and a precision of 70.1%. Simulation results also in-
dicate that the proposed approach is successful in enabling
the user to control the privacy of each individual appliance
with the aid of a configurable parameter. Furthermore,
it is established that the degree of change in the result-
ing total privacy and utility is proportional to the power
consumption of an appliance. The proposed approach is
also compared to the existing ElecPrivacy approach [13]
where the resultant smart meter readings are tested using
two well-known Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM)
algorithms namely: Weiss’ [15] algorithm and Baranski’s
algorithm [16]. The proposed approach has been shown
to outperform the existing approach by generating traces
that are harder to identify thus demonstrating its effec-
tiveness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section
II we highlight the related work in this field, in Section III,
we formulate the considered problem and in Section IV we
present the proposed approach. In section V we evaluate
its performance using simulations and finally in Section VI
we offer our conclusions and future research directions.
2. Related Work
The constantly increasing awareness regarding the re-
lationship between smart meter data and privacy has led
to some interesting research in this field of study. The
research involves proposed approaches stretching between
smart meter data aggregation for introduction of anonymity
to fixing the problem at the origination point and altering
smart meter data before it is read by the smart meter.
Authors in [12][17][18] propose privacy enhancing ap-
proaches using neighbourhood level aggregation and cryp-
tographic protocols. The idea is to use cryptography to se-
cure data from being read by neighbouring smart meters
and then aggregating the data of multiple smart meters
before it is relayed to the utility provider. These algo-
rithms are complemented by the use of verifiable secret
sharing algorithms [19][20] to ensure minimum access to
the private data by an adversary. Moreover, authors in
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[21][22] propose the use of secure multi-party computa-
tion where, the aggregate smart meter data is computed
and released while preserving the confidentialtit of each
households. Similarly, authors in [23] use data random-
ization before aggregation, thus completely hiding the en-
ergy signature of a single household and then relaying the
aggregated data to the utility provider. The baseline as-
sumption is that the utility provider only needs energy
consumption reading for a substation. These approaches
introduce privacy to an individual’s data and offer some
utility to the utility provider in understanding the average
energy consumption pattern of a certain location but it
mitigates the benefits that an individual can obtain from
his own smart meter reading, as he cannot identify the
appliances which contribute most to the total energy con-
sumption thus undermining his ability to achieve energy
efficiency.
To address this problem, authors in [24] focus on dis-
torting the data at the origination point. This would min-
imize the chances of a malicious node’s participation in
the smart meter network for both a passive or an active
attack and would also enable an individual to keep a con-
stant check of his energy consumption pattern. They pro-
pose the use of a stationary Gaussian Markov model for
the energy load measurements. They report that privacy-
utility trade-off can be optimized through water-filling and
for this the privacy mechanism distorts the time-series
data off-line after obtaining the whole sequence, thus using
memory that increases exponentially with the reduction
of the energy harvesting interval. On the other hand, the
authors in [25][26] introduce the notion of partial informa-
tion hiding by introducing uncertainty about individual
values in a time-series by perturbing them. A similar no-
tion is presented in [13][27] where it is pointed out that
simple data perturbation would be easy to identify by the
utility provider as he can identify the actual consumption
pattern by installing a similar smart meter at the power
origination point. It is thus better to off-load some of the
power consumption to batteries at random time intervals.
The proposed approach performs well in hiding the con-
sumption pattern at the source but it affects the average
consumption per harvesting interval, thus mitigating some
benefits of having a smart meter.
Authors in [28][29] highlight the risks of sharing pri-
vate data and propose appropriate trade-off mechanisms
where the user is informed about the usage of his data
and an incentive equal to the privacy cost is offered in re-
turn. In [30] a new Multi-party Access Control (MPAC)
model was proposed that uses Nash Equilibrium to obtain
a unique solution for sharing data with multiple parties
and identify an appropriate incentive. The difficulty with
these approaches is that, they are highly influenced by the
truthfulness and greediness of the user which can entice
them into affecting the originality of the data. This was
dealt with in [31] where, the authors addressed the issue
of participation of consumers in data analytical projects
using a game theoretic model. The main idea is to encour-
age contribution into these studies at an individual self
chosen level of precision, with the condition that the pro-
vided data is authentic. The analyst sets a requirement
for data precision, which has to be met by the provided
data.
In this paper, we formulate a utility-privacy trade-
off problem around which we propose a solution that en-
ables users to decide what amount of information regard-
ing which appliance is shared. This enables the user to
bargain with the utility provider about the information he
is willing to share and the benefits he can get in return
while maintaining the same average consumption per har-
vesting interval. The next section explains in detail the
problem formation and later we explain the proposed ap-
proach.
3. Problem Formulation
Time series data extracted using a smart meter is crit-
ical for ensuring efficient load management and is perilous
if in the hand of an adversary. An adversary can use this
data to extract key private information about a user. In
this section, we formulate the utility-privacy trade-off us-
ing a mathematical framework, where the utility of the
data refers to the amount of meaningful information that
can be extracted from it.
We assume that the harvesting interval of a smart me-
ter is set by the utility provider and remains constant.
During each harvesting interval, t time-series values are
stored by the smart meter. These time-series values are
collectively represented as a set XT , where T represents
the data forwarding instance. The time-series values in
XT can be partitioned into two subsets, the public set S
which the user is willing to share and the private data set
Qr which the user wants to hide, where X
T = (S∪Qr) and
(S ∩Qr) = φ. The private data set Qr comprises of r sub-
sets (Q1 ∪Q2 ∪ ...∪Qn) = Qr, where each subset refers to
a unique appliance in a household. Each unique appliance
works for a different length of time, therefore, each data
set XT contains unique length subsets |Q1|, |Q2|, ...|Qr|
where, |.| represents the cardinality of a set. With such a
data set, the requirement for maintaining the actual av-
erage consumption per harvesting interval is fulfilled by
merely spreading the private data set Qr across the public
set S thus producing a new time-series data X̂T , where
(X̂T ∩ Qr) = φ. This data can then be released to the
provider for ensuring privacy.
We build on the information leakage approach pro-
posed in [32] to identify the mutual information between
the private and the randomized data, I(Qr; X̂
T ) = H(Qr)−
H(Qr|X̂T ), where H(.) and H(.|.) denote the entropy and
the conditional entropy respectively. Here, entropy is re-
ferred to as the expected amount of information contained.
An optimal utility-privacy trade-off approach should min-
imize the expected distortion between the original and the
randomized data while ensuring a privacy constraint εr set
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by the user for each individual secure data set Qr, thus
forming the following optimization problem:
O = min
p(X̂T |XT ,Qr)
E[d(XT , X̂T )] (1)
subject to I(Qr; X̂
T ) ≤ (1− εr)× I(Qr;XT ),∀r
Mutual information has been widely used as a privacy
metric due two main reasons: its well understood prop-
erties and its strong correlation with the well-known ε-
differential privacy [33][34][35]. Differential privacy guar-
antees that two adjacent databases which differ in only one
entry are statistically indistinguishable [36]. This guaran-
tee is particularly effective in making individuals comfort-
able in contributing personal information in to a database.
Consider a database Dn = (D1, ..., Dn) that returns a
query response Y according to a random mechanism PY |Dn
and let D−i denote the set of database entries excluding
Di then:
Definition 1. ((ε,δ)-Differential Privacy (DP) [37]). A
randomized mechanism PY |Dn satisfies (ε, δ)-differential
privacy if for all neighbouring database instances dn and
d̃n
PY |Dn=dn
(ε,δ)
≈ PY |Dn=d̃n (2)
where a randomized mechanism PY |Dn satisfies ε- dif-
ferential privacy if it satisfies (ε,0)-differential privacy. Here,
a smaller value of ε represents a higher level of privacy. An
adversary that generates a query Y for a sufficiently small
ε in ε-differential privacy, then the query response would
be insufficient to distinguish between the two databases
Dn and D−i. In order to build an information theoretic
understanding of the phenomenon of ε-differential privacy
it is combined with mutual information thus yielding Mu-
tual Information Differential Privacy [38][39].
Definition 2. (Mutual-Information Differential Privacy
(MI-DP)[39]). A randomized mechanism PY |Dn satisfies
ε-mutual information differential privacy if:
sup
(i,PDn )
I(Di;Y |D−i) ≤ ε bits (3)
The interpretation of ε-differential privacy into infor-
mation theoretic science relaxes the strict privacy con-
straints of ε-differential privacy thus sandwiching Mutual
Information Differential Privacy between ε-differential pri-
vacy and (ε,δ)-differential privacy [39]:
ε−DP ≥MI −DP ≥ (ε, δ)−DP (4)
The claim herein is that MI-DP is a weaker constraint
than ε-DP but a stronger constraint than (ε,δ)-DP. That is
if a mechanism holds ε-MI-DP than it holds (ε,δ)-DP [39]
where, a lower value of ε represents a higher level of privacy
[38]. The rationale build using the aforementioned privacy
definitions states that the lower the mutual information
between the private dataset Qr and the time-series dataset
X̂T in the optimization problem O, the lower the mutual
information between the removed private dataset entries
Di and the query response Y |D−i in Eq 3. Therefore, a
higher εr would yield a lower ε for ε-MI-DP thus yielding
a higher privacy level.
4. Proposed Approach
In this section, we describe the rationale behind the
proposed approach with relevance to the optimization prob-
lem O. The proposed approach is built on the basis that,
smart meters read consumption data for each household
after every small time interval and this can be as small as
a single second. The smaller the time interval the finer
the granularity of the extracted data and thus the bigger
the privacy risk. These meters store these readings for a
certain time and then relay it to the central unit or neigh-
bouring nodes for data aggregation and forwarding. This
is merely a design choice and we assume for simplicity that,
the user is sending data directly to the utility provider. It
is worth mentioning that, this assumption only exists for
ease of understanding and the proposed approach would
work equally well when data is relayed to neighbouring
nodes for data aggregation.
The proposed approach comprises of two steps: the
data acquisition and pre-processing step and the data dis-
tortion step. The data acquisition step builds a signature
database for all the appliances using the peak and rms volt-
ages and currents along with the real and reactive power.
The data distortion step uses the output of the first step
to identify the appliances and then alter the smart me-
ter signature. The granularity of the extracted data and
the continuous store and forward mechanism of a smart
meter requires the smart meter reading to be changed on
a real time basis. This motivates the need of an Energy
Management Unit (EMU) that keeps a constant check on
the energy requirement of the household and controls an
energy storage unit, a battery in our case, that can either
store or provide energy on the desired time instance as
shown in Fig 1. The EMU maps the energy requirement
of each time instance onto the available appliance signa-
tures in search of a positive identification. In the event of
a positive identification at a particular instance, the cor-
responding value is then hidden based on the user defined
εr value. In case an appliance identified at time t needs to
be hidden then, the EMU calculates the average consump-
tion γ of the household up till time t and uses this value
to decide if the battery needs to be charged or discharged.
The objective is to ensure that the smart meter is only
providing the average consumption γ. The rest is offered
by the battery. This differentiates the average consump-
tion reported by a smart meter from the actual household
consumption per harvesting interval. The difference be-
tween the two averages is realized by altering the average
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consumption γ of future instances using a noise addition
approach explained in detail in the next section.
Figure 1: Block Diagram.
4.1. Step 1: Data Acquisition and Pre-processing
Electrical appliances differ from each other based on
their electrical signatures. An appliance can be of resis-
tive, capacitive, inductive or a predominance type based
on its internal circuitry. For instance, a kettle is almost
purely resistive whereas, a fan can be predominantly in-
ductive. A resistive appliance is simple, as it uses the
available current and voltage to produce power. The ca-
pacitive and inductive circuitries on the other hand act
differently. An inductive circuit advances the current with
respect to the voltage and the opposite happens in case
of a capacitive circuit. As a consequence the power trans-
ferred to an appliance is less than the simple product of
voltage and current that is applied across them. To bet-
ter understand this concept, the terms active and reactive
power are used. In general, appliances work through the
active power, while the reactive power is due to the pres-
ence of an inductive or capacitive component of an appli-
ance. The combination of the active and reactive power
forms another key parameter known as the power factor.
The combination of the active power, reactive power and
the power factor define the signature parameters of an ap-
pliance and these are explained in detail later in this sec-
tion. For steady state linear time-invariant loads, complex
power can be calculated from voltage, current and phase
angles as follows [40]:
S =
1
2
VmIme
j(θV −θi) = P + jQ (5)
Pf = P/|S| (6)
where variables Vm and Im are maximum values of volt-
age and current respectively and variables θV and θI are
phase angles of voltage and current respectively. Here, P
represents the real power, Q the reactive power and Pf
represents the power factor of the system.
The computation of power is different for non-linear
loads and is represented using Fourier series expansion.
The number of terms in the expansion represents the di-
mensions of the features and each coefficient corresponds
to the current and voltage in each of the harmonics. Real
and reactive power can thus be computed by [40]:
In = Z
−1
n Vn = YnVn (7)
where the real power is defined as:
P =
N∑
n=0
Pn = V0I0 +
N∑
n=1
VnIncos(θVn − θIn) (8)
and the reactive power is defined as:
Q =
∑
n=1
NVnInsin(θVn − θIn) (9)
where n is the frequency number, Yn and Zn are the
admittance and impedance matrices respectively. V0 and
I0 are the DC voltage and current respectively and Vn and
In are their effective n
th harmonic.
The power, current and voltage values are then used
to differentiate between different appliances and each of
the unique consumption pattern is referred to as the sig-
nature of an appliance. An appliance signature can be ob-
tained using various mechanisms. One common approach
requires the installation of smart plugs. Each appliance in
a household is powered using a separate smart plug which
then connects the appliance with the EMU. An EMU can
then keep a constant track of the power utilization pattern
of a household. A secondary and more feasible approach is
the use of an outlier/anomaly detection algorithm at the
EMU. Anomaly detection algorithms such as Z-score anal-
ysis [41], the modified Z-Score [42] or Kurtosis computa-
tion [43] enable the EMU with the capability of identifying
the installation of a new appliance in the household which
was not registered with the EMU earlier. With the help
of these algorithms, the EMU keeps a look-out for any
anomaly in the power utilization pattern. An anomaly
once identified is reported by the EMU and can be la-
belled by the user as an appliance that was powered ON
at that particular instance. In this work, we use the latter
approach for storing appliance signatures. The underlying
assumption is that the EMU would detect the anomaly
in the power consumption pattern and the user is aware
of the appliance that was powered ON at that particular
instance. Once all the appliances in a household are regis-
tered, the user would not have to give any further inputs
to the EMU. The appliance signatures obtained using the
aforementioned approach have the following features:
• Real power: This is the first component that dif-
ferentiates between appliances with dissimilar con-
sumptions.
• Power factor: Appliances with similar consumption
are differentiated based on the power factor, which
can differ between appliances of resistive, capacitive
and inductive types.
• Peak current: Appliance signatures also store the
peak current which is the maximum amount of cur-
rent the appliance requires before reacting. This re-
lates directly to the appliance circuit and can help
identify appliances of similar type but different man-
ufacturers.
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• Peak voltage: This identifies the maximum voltage
required by the appliance to start. This along with
the peak current forms the initial spike that is used
to identify the start of a new appliance.
• RMS current: After the initial peak current, the
current requirement of an appliance follow a time-
varying sinusoidal function. The effective value of
this current function is referred to as the RMS cur-
rent.
• RMS voltage: Similar to the RMS current, after the
initial peak voltage, the voltage requirement of an
appliance follows a time-varying sinusoidal function
and the effective value of this voltage function is re-
ferred to as the RMS voltage.
The signature data base generated using the aforemen-
tioned features is later used in the next step to identify the
appliances in the smart meter acquired time-series data
and once the appliances are identified, their signatures are
scattered using a novel battery charging and discharging
pattern.
4.2. Step 2: Data Distortion
In this section we explain in detail how the proposed
approach introduces distortion in the smart meter data on
run-time basis.
We consider the smart meter harvested data as a fi-
nite value data set XT where the cardinality |XT | de-
pends on the harvesting interval β and the granularity
with which the smart meter stores the consumption read-
ing. The EMU maps each value XTi ∈ XT with the appli-
ance signature database Qr. A positive match between the
signature database Qr and X
T
i initiates the data distor-
tion process. The EMU compares εr, the user defined pri-
vacy level, with µ the constantly updated threshold. Here,
{εr|εr ∈ R, 0 ≤ εr ≤ 1} with εr = 1 representing maxi-
mum privacy and εr = 0 representing minimum privacy.
The constantly updating threshold, µ = Ehr/(Etr +Ecr)
is the ratio between the total hidden signature Ehr, the
total energy consumed by an appliance Etr and the en-
ergy required by the appliance Ecr. The comparison be-
tween εr and µ can yield two possible outcomes: 1)εr < µ,
2)εr ≥ µ. The first outcome means no distortion is re-
quired and thus the signature should be left un-altered.
The second outcome on the other hand, requires the sig-
nature to be altered and this is achieved by repeatedly
charging or discharging the battery in a manner that the
smart meter reads a value close to the average consump-
tion value of a household. The average consumption is
represented by γ and it is calculated using:
γ =
i∑
n=0
XTn +Ni (10)
Here, N represents noise and it is explained in de-
tail later in this section. The average consumption γ is
later compared with the current energy requirement of the
household to decide between the charging or discharging
cycles of the battery. In an ideal scenario, if XTi > γ the
EMU would discharge the battery, requesting an amount
of XTi − γ Joules from the battery and fulfilling the total
energy requirement by requesting γ joules from the util-
ity provider through the smart meter. On the flip side, if
XTi < γ the EMU would charge the battery, requesting
an amount of γ from the utility provider and charging the
battery using the surplus amount of γ −XTi Joules. The
constant charging and discharging of the battery will re-
sult in the constant difference between the average energy
consumption reported by the smart meter and the actual
average consumption per harvesting interval. This differ-
ence from the average consumption per harvesting interval
is stored in Rm and is later used to form noise N for Eq
10.
4.2.1. Battery Discharge (XTi > γ)
Every battery is upper and lower bounded by its maxi-
mum and minimum storage capacity respectively and this
limits it from providing XTi − γ joules for all the desired
incidences. To overcome this limitation, the EMU makes
a decision dd = max((X
T
i −γr), (Bc−Bmin)) that will re-
sult in two possible cases. Here Bc is the current energy of
the battery, B′c is the remaining energy in the battery and
Bmin is the minimum energy required to keep a battery
alive.
• Case 1: (XTi − γ) > (Bc −Bmin)
When the difference in the energy requirement of a
household and the running average is greater than
the capacity of the battery then, the battery is com-
pletely drained and the remaining energy require-
ment is fulfilled by the electricity provider which dic-
tates the smart meter reading. The energy required
from the battery and the smart meter are calculated
using the following equations:
X̂Ti = X
T
i − (Bc −Bmin) (11)
Rm = Rm + (Bc −Bmin) (12)
B′c = Bc −Bmin (13)
• Case 2: (XTi − γ) < (Bc −Bmin)
When the difference in energy requirement of a house-
hold and the running average is less than the capac-
ity of the battery then, only the average consumption
γ is fulfilled by the electricity provider which dictates
the smart meter reading and the rest is fulfilled from
the battery. The energy requirements are calculated
using the following equations:
X̂Ti = X
T
i − (XTi − γ) (14)
Rm = Rm + (X
T
i − γ) (15)
B′c = Bc − (XTi − γ) (16)
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4.2.2. Battery Charging (XTi < γ)
Every time the requested energy is less than the av-
erage γ, the EMU will use extra energy from the smart
meter and charge the battery. This charging process will
be limited by the maximum energy Bmax of the battery
and to adapt accordingly to the current capacity of the
battery, the EMU will make the decision dc = max((γ −
XTi ), (Bmax −Bc)). This decision would result in the fol-
lowing two cases:
• Case 1: (γ −XTi ) > (Bmax −Bc)
When the difference between the average energy and
the energy required by the household is greater than
the capacity of the battery, then the decision of the
amount of energy to be forwarded to the battery and
the energy fulfilled through a smart meter are made
as follows:
X̂Ti = X
T
i + (Bmax −Bc) (17)
Rm = Rm − (Bmax −Bc) (18)
B′c = Bc + (Bmax −Bc) (19)
• Case 2: (γ −XTi ) < (Bmax −Bc)
When the difference between the average energy and
the requested energy is less than the maximum avail-
able capacity of the battery, then the EMU will ex-
tract the average energy from the smart meter and
forward the excess energy to the battery as follows:
X̂Ti = X
T
i + (γ −XTi ) (20)
Rm = Rm − (γ −XTi ) (21)
B′c = Bc + (γ −XTi ) (22)
Note that the aforementioned battery charge and dis-
charge mechanisms update the battery status along with
the required energy at every time instance i with the up-
date period being as small as a single second, however
this does not mean that the battery is expected to switch
between charging and discharging state at every time in-
stance. Any appliance running in a household requires
an initial power spike to start its operation, thus gener-
ating the peak voltage and peak current patterns, which
is then followed by a constant RMS current and voltage
requirement that keeps the appliance running. This com-
plete power consumption pattern spans multiple time in-
stances, usually of the order of a few hundreds, thus elim-
inating the need for the battery to change states at ev-
ery time instance. The charging and discharging pattern
of a battery is highly dependent on the type of battery
being used [44]. In case of a Lead acid battery, the dis-
charging constraint of section 4.2.1 would be updated from
(Bc − Bmin) to (Bc − ((Vmin + (V0,d−Vminq1)qmax )It)), where
Vmin is the minimum allowed internal discharge voltage of
the battery, V0,d is the maximum internal discharge volt-
age, q1 is the amount of available charge , qmax is the
maximum charge, I is the current and t is the time dura-
tion of instance i [44]. Likewise, the charging constraint
of section 4.2.2 would be updated from (Bmax − Bc) to
((V0,c + (
(Vmax−V0,c)q1
qmax
)It)−Bc) where, Vmax is the maxi-
mum allowed charging voltage and V0,c is the minimum al-
lowed charging voltage [44]. In both expressions, the factor
of charge q1 would be updated after each iteration, thus
producing a different amount of energy for every charge
and discharge cycle. These different cycles compliment
the noise addition objective of the proposed approach and
therefore, in this paper we do not emphasize on a partic-
ular type of battery.
4.2.3. Noise Addition (N)
The calculation of noise N is inspired by the Haar
Wavelet transform (HWT) [45] and is used to accommo-
date the deviation between the actual average consump-
tion of the household during a harvesting interval and the
average consumption being reported by the smart meter
after distortion. The difference between the averages is
spread across the future time indices of a harvesting in-
terval to influence the calculation of γ. The addition of
noise ensures that the smart meter reports actual average
consumption of a household.
The Noise N is calculated by using multiple random
pairs [Lm,−Lm] that form the leaf nodes of a tree, where
0 < Lm < Bmax and the sum of all the leaf nodes is
zero. These leaf nodes are used to generate the wavelet
coefficients c for each of the internal nodes, such that
c = (a1 − a2)/2, where a1 and a2 are the average val-
ues for the leaves in the left and right subtree. The depth
of the tree is a design choice with a smaller depth yield-
ing more benefits. After processing all the internal nodes,
an additional coefficient, referred to as the base coefficient
c0 is generated by taking the mean of all leaves nodes.
The base coefficient will always result in a zero due to the
selection of the random pairs [Lm,−Lm].
Figure 2: Haar Wavelet Transform.
Example: Fig 2 illustrates a HWT with 8 entries v1, ...v8.
Each number in a circle shows the value of a wavelet coef-
ficient. The base coefficient c0 equals the mean of the en-
tries. The coefficient c1 is the mean difference between the
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averages of the left and right subtree c1 = (45− (−45)/2.
Once the leaf values are spread, the base coefficient is
updated with Rm as: co = co +
Rm
2l
, where l is the depth
of the tree. In order to reduce the chances of an adver-
sary identifying the amount of addition into a leaf node,
Laplacian noise is added into each branch coefficient. This
Laplacian noise is drawn from the Laplacian distribution
with the probability density function p(x|λ) = 12λe
−|x|/λ,
where λ is a design choice.
The addition of Laplacian noise will affect the average
consumption of a household reported by the smart meter.
This is taken care by the use of a mean subtraction pro-
cedure. The mean subtraction procedure divides all but
the base coefficient into disjoint sibling groups such that
each maximal set of coefficients have the same parent in
the tree. For example, in Fig 2, the tree can be divided
into three sibling groups: {c2, c3}, {c4, c5}, and {c6, c7}.
Next for each sibling group, the noise mean is computed
and subtracted from each coefficient in the group, thus
ensuring no change in average harvesting interval energy.
The intuition is that, after the mean subtraction, the noise
coefficient in the same siblings group will sum up to zero.
Finally, Ni for all future instances is calculated as follow-
ing:
Ni = c0 +
l∑
j=1
(gj .c) (23)
where gj equals 1 (−1) if v is in the left(right) subtree
of c.
5. Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the pro-
posed user controllable device specific privacy preserving
approach by testing it on the ECO data set and conduct-
ing simulations on Matlab. The ECO data set presents
real sensor data for 6 households in Switzerland over a pe-
riod of 8 months (June 2012 to January 2013). It contains
measurements of real and reactive power for each of the
three phases in a household and also provides the plug-
level data at 1 Hz frequency. We test the proposed ap-
proach on household 1 from the ECO data set which has 6
different appliances namely: PC, dryer, washing machine,
kettle, fridge and freezer.
Every time-series data generated by a household com-
prises of multiple appliances working in conjunction. The
household under consideration has 6 different appliances
working together. These appliances work for variable length
of time and generate a power consumption pattern as re-
ported in Fig 3. In the first set of experiments, we test the
appliance detection accuracy of the proposed approach.
We feed as input the actual smart meter data to the pro-
posed approach and use the generated time-series data of
the identified appliances to generate a confusion matrix.
We evaluate the accuracy of appliance identification by
(a) Kettle (b) Washing machine (c) Dryer
(d) Fridge (e) PC (f) Freezer
Figure 3: Example of appliance signature
comparing the results generated by the proposed approach
with the available plug level data.
Table 1: Confusion Matrix
Detected Condition
Total Energy Detected Positive Detected Negative
Condition Positive TP=5.737× 109 FN=2.5498× 109 TPR=69.2%
Condition Negative FP=2.4507× 109 TN=3.486210 FPR=6.5%
Accuracy=81.8% Precision=70.1%
FNR=30.7%
TNR=93.4%
Table 1 presents the confusion matrix of the proposed
approach for identifying the number of times in which an
appliance was either confused with other appliances or was
detected correctly. The number of times an appliance was
correctly identified while being powered ON is referred to
as True Positive (TP), whereas, if an appliance was not
working and was incorrectly reported as being powered
ON, is referred to as False Positive (FP). Similarly, the
number of times an appliance was classified OFF when it
was actually ON is referred to as False Negative (FN) and
lastly, an appliance correctly classified OFF is referred to
as True Negative (TN). The fraction of times an appliance
was correctly classified as being ON while it was actually
ON is referred to as the true Positive Rate (TPR) and the
fraction of times the appliance was incorrectly classified
ON while it was actually OFF is referred to as the False
Positive Rate (FPR). Similarly the False Negative Rate
(FNR) and the True Negative Rate (TNR) are defined as
shown below:
TPR =
TP
(TP + FN)
, FPR =
FP
(FP + TN)
(24)
FNR =
FN
(TP + FN)
, TNR =
TN
(FP + TN)
(25)
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Table 2: Percentage participation of each appliance with varying εr for individual devices.
Percentage participation per appliance
Appliance ε1 = 0 ε1 = 0.25 ε1 = 0.5 ε1 = 0.75 ε1 = 1 ε2 = 0 ε2 = 0.25 ε2 = 0.5 ε2 = 0.75 ε2 = 1
Fridge (ε1) 8.61% 6.46% 4.30% 2.15% 0.01% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61%
Dryer (ε2) 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.64% 0.42% 0.21% 0.00%
Kettle (ε3) 4.89% 4.52% 4.16% 3.79% 3.44% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89%
Washing Machine (ε4) 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70%
PC (ε5) 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Freezer (ε6) 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79%
Others 22.15% 24.67% 27.18% 29.70% 32.19% 22.15% 22.36% 22.57% 22.79% 23.00%
ε3 = 0 ε3 = 0.25 ε3 = 0.5 ε3 = 0.75 ε3 = 1 ε4 = 0 ε4 = 0.25 ε4 = 0.5 ε4 = 0.75 ε4 = 1
Fridge (ε1) 8.61% 7.65% 6.53% 5.53% 4.52% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61%
Dryer (ε2) 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85%
Kettle (ε3) 4.89% 3.66% 2.44% 1.22% 0.01% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89%
Washing Machine (ε4) 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 22.26% 14.85% 7.42% 0.02%
PC (ε5) 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01%
Freezer (ε6) 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 33.79% 30.56% 27.35% 24.12% 20.92%
Others 22.15% 24.34% 26.68% 28.90% 31.12% 22.15% 32.81% 43.43% 54.10% 64.70%
ε5 = 0 ε5 = 0.25 ε5 = 0.5 ε5 = 0.75 ε5 = 1 ε6 = 0 ε6 = 0.25 ε6 = 0.5 ε6 = 0.75 ε6 = 1
Fridge (ε1) 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61% 8.61%
Dryer (ε2) 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.85%
Kettle (ε3) 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89% 4.89%
Washing Machine (ε4) 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 29.70% 22.22% 14.83% 7.39% 0.00%
PC (ε5) 0.01% 0.008% 0.006% 0.002% 0.000% 0.01% 0.008% 0.006% 0.003% 0.000%
Freezer (ε6) 33.789% 33.785% 33.782% 33.779% 33.777% 33.789% 25.341% 16.894% 8.447% 0.005%
Others 22.146% 22.155% 22.159% 22.166% 22.170% 22.146% 38.076% 53.914% 69.805% 85.642%
The table also presents the Precision = TPTP+FP and
Accuracy = TP+TNTP+TN+FN+FP . The accuracy and preci-
sion of the proposed approach is highly affected by the
TPR value which was found to be 69%. This is due to
the fact that the proposed approach uses the smart me-
ter reading to identify individual appliances and compares
the results with the available plug level information for
each individual appliance. The plug level information of
a device contains operation cycles for an individual ap-
pliance only whereas, the smart meter data contains en-
ergy utilization of multiple devices running concurrently
and this makes the identification of individual appliances
difficult. A higher power consuming device overshadows
devices that consume less power thus reducing the accu-
racy of the proposed approach. In the considered house-
hold, the Washing Machine, PC and Freezer all work on
the same phase, where a Washing Machine consumes the
most amount of power of around 2300±100 Watts and the
Freezer consumes a peak power of 80 watts followed by an
RMS power of 40 ± 5 Watts, therefore, it is highly likely
that when a Washing Machine is in operation, it is diffi-
cult to identify the operation status of a Freezer. This goes
without saying that the Freezer is in operation throughout
the day and a single operation cycle of a Washing Machine
overshadows multiple operation cycles of the Freezer thus
resulting in a lower TPR value of 69%. In such a scenario,
the proposed approach identifies appliances correctly with
an accuracy of 80.1% and a precision of 70.1%. It is worth
mentioning that the proposed approach identifies appli-
ance signature on the real time basis, whereas approaches
that exist in literature require the complete smart meter
reading for the whole day. To the best of our knowledge
one approach exists that identifies appliances on real time
basis [46] and it reports an accuracy of 84% for a small
dataset of 65 appliance operation cycles. We on the other
hand use smart meter data for 8 months having multiple
appliance operation cycles, therefore, an accuracy of 80.1%
is considered as a satisfactory result.
In the next set of experiments, we investigate the change
in percentage of the identifiable appliance signature as εr is
increased for each appliance individually. Each appliance
has a distinctive power consumption pattern thus gener-
ating a unique signature as reported in Fig 3. Adequate
changes to this signature pattern would render the appli-
ance non identifiable. The increase in εr, associated to an
appliance r, is expected to reduce the percentage of identi-
fiable appliance signature. Fig 4a reports the percentage of
identifiable appliance signature for each individual appli-
ance in the smart meter data for a single day when, εr = 0
∀r. An εr = 0 is the minimum privacy setting and means
that the appliance signature should be left un-altered. Fig
4b, shows a different setting. Each individual appliance is
assigned a different privacy setting using different ε values.
Fridge ε1 = 0.5, Dryer ε2 = 0.8, Kettle ε3 = 0.7, Washing
Machine ε4 = 0.2, PC ε5 = 1 and Freezer ε6 = 0.3. It is ob-
served that the percentage participation of each individual
appliance reduces according to its own epsilon value. For
example, the freezer whose ε6 has increased from 0 to 0.3
has reported a participation decrease from 30% to 24%.
The decrease in the participation of all the appliances has
resulted in the increase of the Other category, which refers
to the consumption reading that does not fall into any of
the appliance signatures.
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(a) εr = 0 ∀r (b) ε1 = 0.5, ε2 = 0.8, ε3 = 0.7,
ε4 = 0.2, ε5 = 1, ε6 = 0.3
Figure 4: Percentage contribution of each appliance for different εr
values. Here, Fridge= ε1, Dryer= ε2, Kettle= ε3, Washing Machine=
ε4, PC= ε5 and Freezer=ε6
We further elaborate on the change in percentage con-
tribution of each appliance signature when the privacy set-
ting εr for only a single appliance is altered at a time, keep-
ing the rest unaltered. Table 2 reports the results when
ε for a single appliance is changed from zero to 1 in steps
of 0.25 and the rest are kept zero. It can be observed
from table 2 that, as the privacy for a particular appliance
increases with an increasing value of ε, the percentage con-
tribution, of that particular appliance decreases.
The original data set shows that, the overall power con-
sumption of the household is divided into three phases.
The Fridge and Kettle work on one phase, the dryer works
separately on one phase and the Washing Machine along
with the PC and Freezer work on the remaining phase. In
a scenario when the user is willing to hide only a single ap-
pliance from the power consumption pattern, an efficient
privacy preserving algorithm would be expected to iden-
tify the appliance correctly even if it is working concur-
rently with multiple other devices and hide the signature
accordingly. This would, as a result, affect the percentage
contribution of the devices that are working on the same
time instance as the concerned device. This phenomenon
is also visible from Table 2 where, by changing the privacy
setting of the Fridge, the percentage contribution of the
Kettle is also being affected and likewise, by changing the
privacy setting of the Freezer, the contribution of the PC
and Washing Machine are also affected, hence highlighting
that the proposed approach correctly identifies appliances
that are working concurrently.
We further validate the performance of the proposed
approach using information theory principles. In particu-
lar, we observe the change in mutual information between
the original smart meter reading and the smart meter read-
ing after it is scattered using the proposed approach. Mu-
tual information quantifies the amount of information two
data sets share and thus how much does one data set reveal
about the other [47]. We use mutual information between
the original and the scattered data set as a measure of util-
ity. Fig 5 reports the change in mutual information when
εr associated to a particular appliance is increased from
zero to one thus increasing the privacy of the appliance.
An increase in privacy should result in a decrease in mu-
tual information and thus a decrease in utility of the data.
However, the question which arises is, which appliances
have the most effect on the overall privacy. Fig 5 reports
that the larger the contribution of an appliance reported
in Fig 4a, the greater the decrease in mutual information
thus a greater decrease in the utility of the data.
Figure 5: Change in mutual information between the Original data
and the smart meter data scattered using the proposed approach for
increasing εr.
Mutual information can also be used to assess privacy
where privacy is a measure of the percentage contribution
of each individual appliance. An increase in privacy in
the considered environment implies that the percentage
contribution of each individual appliance signature should
reduce. We test this by reporting the change in mutual
information between the smart meter data scattered us-
ing the proposed approach and the plug data available for
each appliance. Fig 6 reports that, as the privacy setting
is increased for each individual appliance, the mutual in-
formation between the plug data and the scattered data
decreases thus showing an increase in privacy. The largest
rate of decrease is reported by the Freezer which has the
highest contribution to the overall consumption.
Figure 6: Change in mutual information between the plug data and
the smart meter data scattered using the proposed approach for in-
creasing εr.
We complement our claims using another set of sim-
ulations. In these simulations, we test the privacy pre-
serving capability of the proposed approach against two
well-known Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM) algo-
rithms, namely: The Weiss’ algorithm and the Baranski’s
algorithm. The time-series data generated using the pro-
posed approach is using these NILM algorithms and the
number of appliances being identified is reported. The
10
larger the number of successfully identified appliances, the
lower the level of privacy. Therefore, in an ideal case, max-
imum privacy would be assured when no appliance is being
detected.
NILM algorithms are used to identify appliances in
a household and these algorithms can be broadly cate-
gorized into three classes: unsupervised, semi-supervised
and supervised. An unsupervised algorithm only requires
a household’s aggregate electricity consumption data, a
semi-supervised model utilizes generic appliance models
thus avoiding the requirement of intrusively installing sen-
sors or the use of other training methods, whereas, a su-
pervised approach uses the plug level data along with the
smart meter reading to train and then to identify the ex-
istence of an appliance [48]. For our experiments, we use
two NILM algorithms, a supervised algorithm referred to
as the Weiss’ algorithm [15] and an unsupervised algo-
rithm referred to as the Baranski’s algorithm [48]. The
selection of the Weiss’ algorithm is made with the under-
standing that an approach working well for a supervised
algorithm will naturally be better in performance when
tested against semi-supervised or unsupervised algorithms.
The Weiss’ Algorithm uses both the smart meter and the
plug data available for each household to identify the real
and reactive power of each appliance being used in the
household. It extracts switching events from the house-
hold’s aggregate electricity consumption and assigns each
event to the appliance with the best match in a signature
database. On the other hand, the Baranski’s algorithm
is unsupervised and thus operates without having infor-
mation about the appliances existing in a household. It
identifies recurring electricity consumption events in the
aggregate electricity consumption of a household and clus-
ters these events assuming that events in the same cluster
belong to the same appliance. In these experiments, we
also compare the proposed approach with an existing ap-
proach referred to as the ElecPrivacy [13] approach. The
selection of this approach is due to its most relevance to
the proposed approach as the authors therein identify the
importance of individual appliances in a household. They
divide the storage capacity of the battery source into equal
sized slots where the number of slots is equal to the num-
ber of appliances in the household and use a unique charge
and discharge pattern to hide all the appliances together.
We evaluate the performance of the proposed approach
against the existing ElecPrivacy approach by testing the
generated scrambled time-series data using the Weiss’ and
the Baranski’s algorithm. An algorithm would be con-
sidered efficient in ensuring privacy if it is able to hide
all the appliances, if required by the user, with the hid-
ing being confirmed when Weiss’ and/or the Baranski’s
algorithm are not able to detect the appliances in a house-
hold. Table 3 reports the results when smart meter data
is scattered using the proposed approach and the resulting
scattered data is fed into the Weiss’s algorithm to identify
appliances in the household. In this set of experiments, εr
is increased from 0 to 0.75 in steps of 0.25. The Weiss’s
algorithm is fed with the original plug data along with the
altered smart meter data and then the appliance utiliza-
tion is identified. Table 3 shows the change in true power
and reactive power at On and OFF switching events, where
a positive true power refers to an On switching event and a
negative true power refers to an OFF switching event. It is
evident that as εr increases from 0 to 0.75, the magnitude
of true and reactive powers identified for each individual
appliance decreases. This shows that with an increase in
εr fewer number of switching events are classified for each
individual appliance thus ensuring an increase in privacy.
A reactive power of Inf and NaN is a result of false detec-
tion of an appliance. In the ECO data set, the smart me-
ter power readings are accompanied by the corresponding
changing current and voltage values and when the current
and voltage curves do not support the power curve, the
Weiss’ algorithm reports a NaN or Inf value. Thus it is
clear from Table 3 that the proposed approach works con-
siderably well despite a low accuracy and precision value
reported in Table 1. We also compare the proposed ap-
proach with εr = 1 against the existing ElecPrivacy ap-
proach and report the observed results in Table 4. It is
observed that the proposed approach performs well in hid-
ing an appliance as the Weiss’ algorithm does not identify
any appliance whereas, it identifies most of the appliances
when the existing ElecPrivacy approach is used. The main
reason for this identification of appliances is that they di-
vide the battery energy into equal number of slots, where
this number is decided by the number of appliances in a
household. Each appliance uses the available slot to hide
its signature and the battery is charged when no appli-
ance is consuming energy. In the considered ECO data set
there are 6 appliances and very few intervals during which
the battery can be charged using their defined approach.
On the contrary, the proposed approach uses a novel bat-
tery charging pattern which ensures that the battery is
charged at all possible intervals using a different amount
of energy, hence enabling us to add noise into the smart
meter reading.
We further strengthen our privacy claim by testing the
proposed approach against the unsupervised Baranski’s al-
gorithm. Similar to the previous experiment, the Baran-
ski’s algorithm is fed as input the time-series data scram-
bled using the proposed approach with varying εr from 0 to
1 in steps of 0.25 and the obtained results are compared
with the ElecPrivacy approach. Privacy is measured by
the number of appliances that are successfully identified
by Baranski’s algorithm, where a higher number of iden-
tified appliances is interpreted as a lower level of privacy.
The Baranski’s algorithm takes as input the aggregate
1Hz electricity consumption data for the household. We
set the resulting number of clusters to 20 with the base-
line condition that each appliance can only have two states
with a maximum ON state of 60 minutes. Table 5 reports
the results from the experiment. Each cluster shows the
set of switching events that report a similar change in the
electricity consumption pattern with the column size rep-
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Table 3: Energy consumption data obtained using the Weiss’ algorithm
Appliance
εr = 0∀r εr = 0.25∀r εr = 0.5∀r εr = 0.75∀r
True Power Reactive Power True Power Reactive Power True Power Reactive Power True Power Reactive Power
Freezer -30.28 -29.91 -32.28 -37.38 -154.77 NaN -114.47 Inf
Freezer 29.52 27.61 178.36 NaN 128.29 -Inf 104.73 NaN
Washing Machine -2160.37 3.65 -731.76 -63.36 -1149.96 -2.56 -1101.37 4.49
Washing Machine 2195.10 10.21 735.74 57.49 4828.41 1.07 1453.01 0.36
Washing Machine 793.83 336.61 0 0 0 0 0 0
PC -50.32 -50.69 -20.53 18.69 -23.63 13.43 -22.05 -0.18
PC -28.17 16.99 -36.41 -19.53 30.85 12.00 28.81 -14.61
PC 64.55 -14.26 32.08 -2.53 24.62 -44.69 0 0
PC 92.36 68.29 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fridge -24.12 -0.21 -151.02 Inf -120.84 Inf -96.81 Inf
Fridge 24.05 0.11 152.52 NaN 134.32 NaN 113.29 -Inf
Fridge 61.15 -12.66 0 0 0 0 0 0
Water Kettle -1824.00 28.61 -1257.38 -22.50 -1406.03 -28.96 -590.06 25.42
Water Kettle -1846.49 -43.21 -635.30 13.73 -684.27 5.06 -1149.41 4.34
Water Kettle 1872.67 73.17 1753.02 64.32 580.25 43.17 668.86 71.91
Water Kettle 1850.34 -22.55 1108.42 271.07 0 0 1107.67 18.30
Dryer -494.89 -181.71 318.42 -7.27 -396.36 5.72 389.90 -5.18
Dryer 544.54 172.12 360.20 255.35 377.65 -10.05 0 0
Dryer 0 0 0 0 325.16 -10.27 0 0
Table 4: Energy consumption data obtained using the Weiss’ algo-
rithm
Appliance
Proposed Approach εr = 1∀r ElecPrivacy [13]
True Power Reactive Power True Power Reactive Power
Freezer 0 0 -30.27 -29.69
Freezer 0 0 29.39 27.04
Washing Machine 0 0 -2190.65 -13.70
Washing Machine 0 0 854.92 373.17
Washing Machine 0 0 2194.01 10.59
PC 0 0 -42.30 -4.90
PC 0 0 64.55 -14.26
PC 0 0 92.36 68.29
PC 0 0 0 0
Fridge 0 0 -24.16 -0.21
Fridge 0 0 24.36 0.26
Fridge 0 0 0 0
Water Kettle 0 0 -1832.91 -9.06
Water Kettle 0 0 1848.75 -30.02
Water Kettle 0 0 1862.13 82.14
Water Kettle 0 0 0 0
Dryer 0 0 -494.89 -181.71
Dryer 0 0 544.54 172.12
Dryer 0 0 0 0
resenting the number of events in a cluster. To enhance the
usability and clarity of the obtained results, time stamps
in the plug level information are used to assign each event
to an appliance. The percentage of each assigned event in
a cluster is reported in the % column and it is calculated
using the proportion of events assigned to the appliance
divided by the overall number of events in the cluster. Col-
umn App 1 and App 2 represent the appliances that have
the highest and second highest number of assigned events
in a cluster respectively. It can be observed that, when no
privacy is introduced with εr = 0 ∀r, Cluster 4 and Cluster
6 exclusively contain stop and start event of the Freezer re-
spectively, while, Cluster 1 reports a switching event due to
both the Washing Machine and the Freezer. Table 5 high-
lights that, as εr ∀r increases from 0 to 1, the overall size of
clusters increase resulting in a decrease in participation of
individual appliances. At the same time, the magnitude of
the change in power ∆P also decreases with increasing εr.
These changes are merely a result of the increase in noise
in the generated time-series data. The addition of noise
divides a single high power spike into multiple small steps
thus generating a large number of clusters with smaller
∆P values. In the considered household, the Fridge and
the Freezer consume the smallest amount of RMS power,
resulting in their more frequent identification when more
noise is added into the generated time-series data. In a
household, a Fridge and a Freezer run continuously for the
whole day, exhibiting no correlation with the presence or
absence of an individual. Therefore, the identification of
these devices is not considered as a privacy breach. Con-
sidering this, it is observed from table 5 that, the proposed
approach increases privacy as εr increases from 0 to 1. On
the contrary, when the same Baranski’s algorithm is used
to identify appliances from the time-series data generated
using the ElecPrivacy approach, table 5 reports that, most
of the appliances are still easily identifiable with only a
slight change in the magnitude of ∆P.
In the final set of results, we demonstrate the beneficial
effect of noise addition to the proposed approach. Fig 7
shows the resultant smart meter data for a randomly se-
lected date (7/06/2012) when the proposed approach and
the ElecPrivacy approach are used. It also presents the
original smart meter data for reference. In this set of ex-
periments, we use a harvesting interval of 5 minutes (300
sec). This creates the need for any privacy ensuring algo-
rithm to ensure that the average power consumption for
each 300 sec interval remains the same despite the neces-
sary scattering. Fig 7b shows that the proposed approach
maintains the same energy consumption pattern as that
reported in Fig 7a whereas, ElecPrivacy in Fig 7c reports
a different pattern. At the initial stages from time values
2.2× 104 and 2.4× 104 there is an extra peak. This does
hide an appliance that might be running on the particu-
lar instance but it changes the average consumption per
harvesting interval thus forcing the consumer to pay more
due to the altered smart meter reading. Moreover, a pat-
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Table 5: Event clusters provided by Baranski’s algorithm
Cluster
εr = 0∀r εr = 0.25∀r
∆P Size App.1 % App.2 % ∆P Size App.1 % App.2 %
C1 -67 4158 Washing Machine 18% Freezer 15% 34 49070 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1%
C2 -92 3000 Washing Machine 7% Fridge 1% -31 41802 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1%
C3 37 2602 Washing Machine 14% Fridge 11% -33 41600 Freezer 1% Washing Machine 1%
C4 -19 2548 Freezer 28% Fridge 6% 35 30854 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1%
C5 143 2538 Washing Machine 9% Fridge 0% 51 13523 Dryer 1% Freezer 1%
C6 56 2490 Freezer 27% Washing Machine 18% -50 12583 Freezer 1% Fridge 1%
C7 -126 1889 Washing Machine 12% Dryer 3% -45 12170 Freezer 3% Fridge 1%
C8 50 1806 Washing Machine 9% Fridge 1% 39 10983 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1%
C9 119 1520 Washing Machine 5% Fridge 1% 56 8769 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1%
C10 -70 943 Washing Machine 4% Dryer 3% -56 7564 Freezer 1% Washing Machine 1%
C11 85 726 Washing Machine 6% Dryer 3% 37 7146 Freezer 3% Fridge 1%
C12 574 495 Fridge 26% Freezer 1% -71 6156 Washing Machine 2% Freezer 1%
C13 1658 483 Fridge 4% Washing Machine 1% -2060 4877 Dryer 2% Washing Machine 2%
C14 88 450 Washing Machine 8% Fridge 6% 2045 3263 Dryer 3% Washing Machine 2%
C15 -1271 397 Fridge 4% Water Kettle 2% 2212 2798 Washing Machine 2% Dryer 2%
C16 -504 375 Fridge 3% Washing Machine 2% 103 1954 Fridge 1% Freezer 1%
C17 2042 371 Water Kettle 4% Fridge 3% -105 1494 Freezer 1% Fridge 1%
C18 -80 360 Fridge 7% Dryer 6% -2027 1044 Dryer 2% Washing Machine 2%
C19 -1940 354 Water Kettle 4% Fridge 3% 2713 216 Washing Machine 4% Fridge 1%
C20 -2060 176 Fridge 10% Freezer 3% -2805 216 Washing Machine 4% Dryer 1%
εr = 0.5∀r εr = 0.75∀r
∆P Size App.1 % App.2 % ∆P Size App.1 % App.2 %
C1 -42 54680 Freezer 1% Washing Machine 1% 31 51694 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1%
C2 44 47283 Freezer 1% Dryer 1% -28 45829 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1%
C3 35 44248 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1% -29 42509 Freezer 1% Washing Machine 1%
C4 -31 35469 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1% 30 34380 Freezer 1% Washing Machine 1%
C5 -47 12758 Fridge 1% Freezer 1% 31 14827 Freezer 2% Fridge 1%
C6 43 12471 Freezer 1% Fridge 1% -29 11718 Freezer 4% Fridge 1%
C7 44 9781 Washing Machine 1% Freezer 1% 34 11457 Freezer 1% Washing Machine 1%
C8 -50 9446 Freezer 1% Fridge 1% -41 11298 Freezer 1% Fridge 1%
C9 -40 8701 Freezer 4% Fridge 1% 40 9840 Freezer 1% Fridge 1%
C10 37 6942 Washing Machine 1% Fridge 1% -41 8219 Freezer 1% Washing Machine 1%
C11 -57 5801 Fridge 1% Freezer 1% -45 6865 Freezer 1% Fridge 1%
C12 1288 4899 Fridge 2% Dryer 2% 49 3879 Fridge 1% Dryer 1%
C13 -1281 4813 Fridge 2% Water Kettle 1% -1111 3526 Washing Machine 2% Fridge 2%
C14 40 4603 Freezer 4% Fridge 2% 1157 3327 Dryer 2% Washing Machine 2%
C15 78 1581 Freezer 1% Fridge 1% -3796 1644 Dryer 2% Washing Machine 2%
C16 -129 660 Fridge 2% Washing Machine 1% 3793 1599 Dryer 2% Fridge 2%
C17 3086 594 Washing Machine 3% Freezer 2% 3814 562 Washing Machine 2% Fridge 1%
C18 -3076 589 Washing Machine 2% Fridge 1% -3773 562 Washing Machine 3% Freezer 1%
C19 -3185 27 Freezer 4% Washing Machine 4% -3911 539 Washing Machine 5% Dryer 2%
C20 3107 26 Fridge 0% Freezer 0% 3931 530 Washing Machine 4% Dryer 2%
εr = 1∀r ElecPrivacy [13]
∆P Size App.1 % App.2 % ∆P Size App.1 % App.2 %
C1 20 45089 Freezer 1% Dryer 1% -34 5307 Freezer 24% Washing Machine 10%
C2 -30 39203 Freezer 2% Dryer 1% 153 2752 Washing Machine 8% Fridge 2%
C3 18 34441 Freezer 1% Fridge 1% 38 2650 Washing Machine 14% Fridge 12%
C4 -16 32727 Freezer 1% Fridge 11% 59 2411 Freezer 27% Washing Machine 19%
C5 -16 30863 Freezer 1% Fridge 1% -128 2410 Washing Machine 20% Fridge 5%
C6 34 26954 Freezer 1% Dryer 1% -100 2279 Washing Machine 10% Dryer 3%
C7 -32 16222 Freezer 3% Fridge 1% -102 2073 Washing Machine 6% Dryer 1%
C8 52 14939 Freezer 2% Dryer 1% 59 2012 Washing Machine 10% Fridge 1%
C9 -44 14638 Dryer 1% Freezer 1% 125 1545 Washing Machine 5% Dryer 1%
C10 22 9547 Freezer 2% Dryer 1% 91 763 Washing Machine 6% Dryer 3%
C11 21 5314 Freezer 1% Fridge 1% -71 580 Washing Machine 4% Dryer 4%
C12 -34 3873 Freezer 2% Fridge 1% 90 461 Washing Machine 7% Fridge 7%
C13 -156 2650 Fridge 1% Freezer 1% -503 456 Fridge 2% Washing Machine 2%
C14 -47 1938 Freezer 2% Fridge 1% -1277 425 Fridge 4% Water Kettle 2%
C15 140 1694 Fridge 3% Washing Machine 3% 1239 420 Fridge 5% Washing Machine 1%
C16 164 1638 Fridge 2% Fridge 2% -1948 378 Water Kettle 4% Fridge 3%
C17 -704 615 Dryer 3% Fridge 2% -84 366 Fridge 7% Dryer 6%
C18 706 588 Fridge 4% Dryer 3% 2031 330 Water Kettle 4% Fridge 2%
C19 1873 173 Fridge 3% Dryer 2% 1911 319 Fridge 6% Washing Machine 3%
C20 -1944 157 Fridge 1% Dryer 1% -2028 204 Fridge 8% Freezer 3%
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(a) Original
(b) Proposed
(c) ElecPrivacy [13]
Figure 7: Smart meter reading of a household on 7/06/2012 for com-
parison between the a)original reading b) after scrambling using the
proposed approach c) after scrambling using the existing ElecPrivacy
approach.
tern similar to the original meter is reported in the interval
from 2.4× 104 and 2.8× 104 as a result of the battery not
having sufficient energy to alter the smart meter reading
thus revealing all the appliances.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we highlight the relationship between ap-
pliance specific privacy of an individual and the utility of
a smart meter generated data. We proposed a new ap-
proach that allows the user to control the amount of in-
formation that is being shared regarding each individual
appliance. This allows the user to trade between the level
of user data privacy in exchange to the utility of the re-
sultant smart meter data. Simulations were conducted to
test the proposed approach with respect to the amount of
privacy achieved and the resulting smart meter data util-
ity. Results indicate the proposed approach is successful
in controlling the privacy of each individual appliance and
the utility of the resulting smart meter data. Appliances
with higher power consumption are also found to have a
larger effect on the total privacy achieved. The obtained
results also indicate an improvement in performance of
the proposed approach when compared with the existing
ElecPrivacy approach. This comparison was conducted
by feeding the resulting smart meter data into the Weiss’
and the Baranski’s algorithms which highlight that, the
traces generated by the proposed approach are harder to
identify. The latter demonstrates its effectiveness. In the
future, we aim at adopting a more analytical approach to
the considered problem by attempting a direct or subop-
timal solution to the posed optimization problem.
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